E-mail security
SPF, DKIM and DMARC prevent fraudsters from sending e-mails in your name. STARTTLS and MTA-STS protect the transport.
- Forged e-mail
- Recipient checks SPF and DKIM
- DMARC decides
- Rejected
What eam.ch checks
| Check | Severity |
|---|---|
No DMARC record (_dmarc) | high |
No SPF, or SPF with +all/?all | high/medium |
DMARC p=none | medium |
| MX without STARTTLS or with invalid certificate | medium |
| No DKIM under common selectors | low |
| No MTA-STS; domain without MX not locked | info |
Records
example.ch. TXT "v=spf1 mx include:_spf.provider.example -all" _dmarc.example.ch. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.ch; adkim=s; aspf=s" ; domain without e-mail (null MX, RFC 7505): noreply.example.ch. MX 0 . noreply.example.ch. TXT "v=spf1 -all"
Notes on introduction
- SPF: at most 10 DNS lookups (RFC 7208, section 4.6.4); keep
includechains flat. - DKIM: keys of at least 2048 bits, rotate selectors. eam.ch only finds common selectors; a missing result is therefore “low”.
- DMARC: evaluate aggregate reports (
rua) for a few weeks, thenquarantinewithpctand finallyreject. - MTA-STS (RFC 8461) with TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) enforces encrypted delivery; DANE (RFC 7672) requires DNSSEC.
Since 2024, large mailbox providers have required SPF, DKIM and DMARC from bulk senders.
In short
- Without DMARC anyone can forge e-mails with your domain.
- SPF names the permitted servers, DKIM signs, DMARC decides.
- The goal is p=reject – step by step, after evaluating the reports.
- STARTTLS and MTA-STS protect the transport.
Learn more: E-mail protocols (mail.eam.ch) – SMTP, IMAP, SPF, DKIM, DMARC: how e-mail works and where it is heading.
Check it yourself
Commands to verify on Linux or macOS. Replace ihre-domain.ch with your domain and only check your own systems.
dig +short TXT ihre-domain.ch | grep spf1
dig +short TXT _dmarc.ihre-domain.ch
dig +short TXT _mta-sts.ihre-domain.ch
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx.ihre-domain.ch:25 </dev/null | head -5