DNS and DNSSEC
The internet's phone book: how DNSSEC prevents forged answers, what CAA is for and why dangling records are dangerous.
- Question: where is www?
- Signed answer
- Resolver checks
- Forgery detected
What eam.ch checks
| Check | Severity | Type |
|---|---|---|
| DNSSEC broken (validation fails, domain unreachable for validating resolvers) | high | passive |
| Dangling subdomain (CNAME to an unclaimed resource, “subdomain takeover”) | high | passive |
| Zone transfer (AXFR) allowed for everyone | high | active |
| DNSSEC not enabled (no DS in the parent zone) | low | passive |
| Name servers not distributed for resilience | low | passive |
| No CAA record | info | passive |
DNSSEC
The zone is signed (RRSIG, DNSKEY); the hash of the key (DS) is stored in the parent zone – for .ch at SWITCH, entered via the registrar. The number one source of errors is a change of provider without replacing the DS record – the domain then becomes unreachable for validating resolvers (e.g. Quad9, many ISPs). Check: dig +dnssec example.ch SOA, delv example.ch, DNSViz.
CAA
example.ch. CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" example.ch. CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@example.ch"
Certificate authorities have been required to check CAA since 2017 (CA/Browser Forum, RFC 8659).
Dangling records and zone transfer
- When shutting down a service, remove the DNS record first, then the resource.
- Allow AXFR only to your own secondary name servers (BIND:
allow-transfer; Plesk: Tools & Settings → DNS Template → Transfer Restrictions).
In short
- DNS is the internet's phone book – forged records redirect visitors.
- DNSSEC seals the records; take the DS record along when changing provider.
- Delete dangling records before strangers take them over.
- CAA specifies who may issue certificates.
Check it yourself
Commands to verify on Linux or macOS. Replace ihre-domain.ch with your domain and only check your own systems.
dig +dnssec ihre-domain.ch SOA @9.9.9.9 | grep -E 'flags|RRSIG'
dig +short CAA ihre-domain.ch